Overview: Walt Disney Co. (NYSE: DIS) recently delivered mixed quarterly results – traditional media revenues fell even as streaming showed improvement – but Bernstein (now part of SocGen) has reiterated an “Outperform” rating on the stock with a $129 price target ([1]). The Bernstein analysts acknowledged Disney’s earnings “weren’t clean” (containing some one-time charges) yet maintain that the company’s long-term investment thesis remains intact ([1]). They emphasize Disney’s unique ability to generate double-digit EPS growth, which is “still not easy to find” for a company of Disney’s size without relying on trendy themes like AI ([1]). Below, we dive into Disney’s fundamentals – from its dividend policy and balance sheet health to valuation, risks, and key questions ahead – to understand the backdrop of this bullish stance.
Dividend Policy & Shareholder Returns
Disney has a long history of paying dividends, but suspended its dividend in 2020 amid the pandemic’s impact on earnings and cash flow. Prior to that pause, Disney’s last quarterly dividend was $0.88 per share paid in January 2020 ([2]). After a three-year hiatus, the company reinstated a dividend in late 2023 – albeit at a much smaller rate. The board declared a $0.30 per share cash dividend (for the second half of FY2023) paid in January 2024 ([3]). According to Disney’s Chairman Mark Parker, this move balanced returning some cash to shareholders with continuing to invest in the business for growth ([3]).
Disney has since signaled a commitment to gradually growing the payout. In December 2024, the board hiked the annual dividend to $1.00 per share (to be paid in two $0.50 installments in FY2025) – a 33% increase over the $0.75 per share distributed during fiscal 2024 ([4]). Even with that increase, Disney’s dividend yield remains modest – roughly on the order of ~1% at the current share price – reflecting a cautious capital return policy. The company’s dividend payout is deliberately conservative as management prioritizes funding content, expansions, and deleveraging after the Fox acquisition and pandemic downturn. Notably, activist investors had pressed for the dividend’s return; CEO Bob Iger promised in early 2023 to have the dividend reinstated by year-end ([2]), a promise the company delivered on. Given the low payout ratio (Disney’s ~$1.4 billion of dividends in FY2024 was easily covered by free cash flow, as discussed below), there is room for further dividend growth if earnings accelerate.
(Disney has not conducted share buybacks in recent years, after suspending repurchases to preserve cash for the $71 billion Fox acquisition in 2019 and pandemic recovery. With the dividend now restored, share repurchases could remain on hold until leverage comes down. Shareholder returns are currently focused on the dividend.)
Leverage and Debt Maturities
Disney carries a significant debt load stemming from its past acquisitions (e.g. Fox) and COVID-related losses. As of FY2023 (Sep. 30, 2023), total borrowings were about $46.4 billion, down slightly from $48.4 billion a year prior ([5]). The company has been using excess cash to chip away at debt – though absolute debt remains high, it is manageable for a company of Disney’s scale. Disney held a cash balance of $14.2 billion at FY2023 year-end ([5]), putting net debt around ~$32 billion.
Debt profile: The bulk of Disney’s debt is long-term, fixed-rate notes. U.S. dollar denominated notes make up roughly $43.5 billion, with maturities staggered between 2024 and 2031 ([5]). The company also has about $1.9 billion in foreign currency bonds (maturing 2025–2027) and typically around $1–2 billion in short-term commercial paper for liquidity management ([5]). Disney’s weighted-average coupon on its borrowings is relatively low – about 4.0% (with an effective interest rate just under 5% after interest rate swaps) ([5]) – reflecting its solid investment-grade credit ratings. In FY2023, interest expense was ~$1.97 billion ([5]), which represents an average cost of debt in the mid-4% range on the ~$46 billion gross debt. Notably, interest expense jumped 27% year-over-year (from $1.55 billion in 2022) due to rising benchmark rates and the refinancing of some debt at higher rates ([5]). Most of Disney’s debt is fixed-rate, which mitigates near-term interest rate risk, but as portions mature in coming years, refinancing could modestly increase interest costs if rates stay elevated.
Maturity schedule: The company faces a current portion of debt about $4.3 billion coming due within a year (as of Sep. 2023) ([5]), which is readily covered by Disney’s cash on hand and ongoing cash generation. The remaining long-term debt is spread over the next decade. The 2024–2025 maturities are moderate in size, and Disney has unused credit facilities and access to capital markets to address these. Disney’s strong cash flow generation (discussed below) and historically prudent financial management suggest it should be able to service and refinance its obligations without strain, barring a major downturn.
Cash Flows and Coverage Ratios
Despite tepid net income in recent years, Disney’s cash generation has improved significantly as the business recovered post-pandemic and underwent cost restructuring. In FY2023, Disney produced $9.87 billion in operating cash flow from continuing operations ([5]), a large increase from ~$6.0 billion in 2022. This improvement was driven by higher profits in the Parks segment and working capital actions (and occurred despite heavy content spend and restructuring payouts). Capital expenditures totaled $4.97 billion in FY2023 ([5]), largely for its Parks, Experiences and Products division (park expansions, cruise ships, etc.) as well as technology and facilities. Subtracting capex, free cash flow was roughly $4.9 billion for the year.
This free cash easily covered Disney’s renewed dividend – for context, the $0.75/share paid in FY2024 amounted to roughly $1.3–1.4 billion (total), meaning a payout ratio of only ~28% of FCF. Even the higher $1.00/share annual rate announced for FY2025 would be about $1.8 billion in dividends, still under 40% of 2023 free cash flow. In other words, Disney’s dividend is well-supported by cash generation, leaving room for both debt reduction and growth investments.
Disney’s ability to cover its fixed charges has also remained solid. In FY2023, interest expense (~$2 billion) was covered roughly 5× by operating income (even excluding any add-backs), indicating strong interest coverage. For example, income from continuing operations before taxes was $4.77 billion ([5]), which, when adding back ~$1.97 billion of interest expense, implies ~$6.7 billion of EBIT – about 3.4× coverage on a net income basis, or higher on an EBITDA basis. Using a cash flow metric, interest coverage is even more comfortable: operating cash flow was nearly 5× the outlay on interest in 2023. The fixed-charge coverage of Disney’s debt thus appears healthy. Moreover, with the rebound in Parks profitability and cost cuts in streaming, Disney’s EBITDA is on an upswing, which should further improve coverage ratios going forward (even as interest costs rise modestly).
Debt/EBITDA leverage: By rough figures, Disney’s gross debt of ~$46 billion is about 3.0–3.5× its current EBITDA. This leverage ratio has been trending down as earnings normalize. Disney’s management has stated an intention to reduce absolute debt over time (using excess cash flow), which would bring leverage to more conservative levels. Overall, credit risk is not a red flag for Disney at present – the company maintains strong access to financing and its balance sheet is robust relative to many media peers. The main financial challenge is ensuring that new investments (in streaming content, parks, etc.) yield returns to grow EBITDA faster than interest costs.
Valuation and Outlook
At the time of Bernstein’s call, Disney’s stock was trading around the low $100s per share. With ~1.83 billion shares outstanding, this equates to a market capitalization near $180–190 billion ([6]). Based on Disney’s own guidance and analyst estimates, earnings are set to rebound strongly over the next two years. Management raised FY2025 EPS guidance to $5.75 (up >15% year-over-year) ([6]). At ~$105/share, that implies a forward P/E of ~18× – a fairly reasonable multiple in line with the broader market, especially given Disney’s brand strength and projected growth. Bernstein’s research suggests the stock is “slightly undervalued” relative to its intrinsic fair value ([6]). Their $120–129 price target reflects confidence that the market will come to appreciate Disney’s earnings power as transitory headwinds abate.
Disney’s enterprise value (equity plus net debt) is approximately $220 billion. Relative to EBITDA, the stock trades around 12–13× EV/EBITDA on forward estimates – a middling valuation between higher-multiple streaming/tech peers and lower-multiple legacy media companies. For example, pure-streaming rival Netflix trades at a higher multiple of cash flow thanks to its growth profile, while traditional TV-centric firms (like Paramount or Warner Bros. Discovery) trade at lower multiples due to secular decline. Disney sits in between, which is logical given its hybrid model – it has high-growth segments (streaming, parks, franchises) but also legacy businesses in decline.
Importantly, Disney’s earnings profile is expected to improve dramatically through FY2026. Bernstein projects continued robust growth into FY2026, fueled by several factors: direct-to-consumer (DTC) margin expansion, cruise line capacity additions, and recovery in Parks attendance and pricing ([6]). By FY2026, Disney’s EPS could reach the mid-$6 range ([6]), in Bernstein’s view, which would put the stock at only ~15× FY2026 earnings at today’s price. The prospect of mid-teens earnings growth for a company of Disney’s scale is a core element of the bull thesis ([1]). Historically, Disney has often traded at a premium P/E due to its strong brands and quality assets – so if the company delivers on returning to ~$6+ EPS, valuation multiples could expand.
Another lens on valuation is sum-of-the-parts: Disney’s businesses include Media (studios, networks), Parks/Experiences, and DTC streaming. Parks & Experiences alone earned ~$9 billion in operating profit in FY2023 ([5]), which arguably could be worth well over $100 billion as a standalone (given the high margins and unique assets like theme parks, cruise lines, consumer products). The DTC segment is currently low-margin but carries significant long-term value with ~150+ million streaming subscribers across Disney+, Hulu, and ESPN+. Asset sales have also been floated for parts of the business (e.g. a stake in ESPN or the linear TV networks), which could unlock value. These considerations underpin the view that Disney’s current stock price bakes in a lot of bad news and offers upside if management’s turnaround plan gains traction.
In summary, Disney’s valuation appears attractive relative to its earnings rebound trajectory – especially if one believes the “magic” of the Disney brand can translate into consistent growth across content, streaming, and parks. The Outperform rating from Bernstein is predicated on this multi-year earnings recovery and the notion that Disney’s assets are worth more than they’re being credited for in the market.
Risks and Red Flags
While Disney has many strengths, it also faces several risks and challenges that investors should monitor:
– Declining Linear Media: Disney’s traditional TV and film businesses are in secular decline. Most recently, the Entertainment division’s revenue fell 6% year-over-year, driven by weakness in linear TV channels and a soft theatrical slate ([1]). Operating income from Disney’s linear networks dropped 21% as cord-cutting continues to erode cable profits ([1]). Broadcast advertising is under pressure, and movie box office results have been mixed (some Marvel and Pixar releases underperformed expectations). This structural decline in legacy media is a red flag: Disney must manage a tough transition from the high-margin cable/TV model to the digital streaming era. There is a risk that the shrinkage of the old model outpaces the growth of the new.
– Streaming Profitability & Competition: Disney’s direct-to-consumer streaming segment (which includes Disney+, Hulu, and ESPN+) is not yet firmly profitable. In the latest quarter, streaming was a bright spot, with DTC operating income improving to $352 million (up 39% YoY) ([1]) thanks to price increases and cost controls. However, that profit level is still small relative to Disney’s overall size, and it was achieved largely by raising prices (which could slow subscriber growth). Disney faces intense competition from Netflix, Amazon, Apple, and others in the streaming wars. Keeping subscriber momentum while achieving meaningful profit margins is a delicate balance. If Disney+ growth stalls (or if content spending must rise significantly to compete), the streaming business could flatten out financially. Content churn is a concern as well – Disney removed certain content from its platforms in 2023 and took impairment charges, signaling that not all streaming investments have paid off. The company’s ability to consistently produce must-see content for its streaming services (to justify further price hikes) remains an ongoing challenge.
– High Debt & Interest Costs: Disney’s ~$46 billion debt load is a lingering risk factor. Although manageable now, it leaves less flexibility if the company were to face an economic downturn or another crisis. Rising interest rates have already driven Disney’s interest expense up by over 25% last year ([5]); if Disney needed to refinance a large chunk of debt in a high-rate environment, interest costs could climb further and squeeze margins. Additionally, while Disney carries an investment-grade credit rating, rating agencies will be watching leverage metrics. A significant downturn in EBITDA (or a debt-funded acquisition) could risk a downgrade. That said, Disney is currently de-leveraging and interest coverage is solid, so this is a moderate risk – but worth keeping an eye on, especially given macroeconomic uncertainty.
– Profit Concentration in Parks: An often overlooked issue is how much of Disney’s earnings come from its Parks, Experiences and Products segment. In FY2023, Parks/Experiences delivered $8.95 billion in segment operating income – about 70% of Disney’s total segment OI ([5]). The parks business has been booming post-pandemic (with strong per-guest spending and high demand), but it is highly cyclical and vulnerable to external shocks. A recession, a travel slowdown, or another event like a pandemic can significantly hit park attendance and profitability. Parks are also capital-intensive (continuous investment in new attractions, ships, maintenance). This reliance on tourism and consumer spending introduces risk: Disney’s overall earnings could be hurt if the parks segment cools off. Investors should watch for any signs of attendance declines or lower guest spending – for instance, recent reports indicate attendance at domestic parks has been flat or down slightly after multiple price increases, which could foreshadow a plateau.
– One-Time Charges and Execution Risks: The “messiness” in Disney’s recent earnings is partly due to large one-time charges, which raise red flags about past strategy missteps. In FY2023, Disney recorded a $3.9 billion restructuring and impairment charge ([5]), including a $2.58 billion write-down of content (for removing underperforming shows/films from streaming) and $721 million in goodwill impairments. While these charges were taken to streamline operations and cut costs, they underscore that Disney overinvested in certain content and businesses that didn’t pan out. Execution risk remains: management must prove that the current restructuring – including $5.5 billion in targeted cost savings – will yield durable earnings gains. If cost cuts undermine creative output or if hoped-for efficiencies don’t materialize, Disney might not hit its margin improvement targets. Additionally, integration of acquisitions (like Hulu, discussed below) could bring hiccups or further write-downs. The presence of hefty “adjustments” in results is a watch item – investors prefer clean earnings, so Disney needs to minimize further special charges going forward.
– Leadership Transition and Governance: Disney’s management stability is in question after a period of upheaval. Bob Iger’s surprise return as CEO in late 2022 (replacing his hand-picked successor Bob Chapek) highlighted succession planning issues. Iger’s contract now runs through 2026, and the board has explicitly stated it will name a new CEO by early 2026 ([7]). There is execution risk during this transition – a new CEO could shift strategy or face a learning curve managing Disney’s sprawling empire. Moreover, any missteps in choosing Iger’s successor could be detrimental (Disney has faced criticism and investor pressure about its succession process ([7])). The company did appoint a new Chairman (former Morgan Stanley CEO James Gorman) to lead the CEO search and improve governance ([7]). Still, uncertainty around who the next chief will be – and whether that person will continue Iger’s strategic vision – is a risk factor. This uncertainty is amplified by activist investor interest: Nelson Peltz’s Trian Fund waged a proxy battle in 2023–24, citing frustration with Disney’s performance and leadership. Although Disney prevailed in that board fight ([8]), Trian could return if results disappoint or if the succession plan wavers. In short, management and board decisions in the next 1–2 years will be critical, and any instability could weigh on the stock.
– Franchise Fatigue and Creative Challenges: A key part of Disney’s bull case is its unparalleled library of intellectual property (Marvel, Star Wars, Pixar, Disney Animation, etc.). However, some recent content releases have underwhelmed. For example, Marvel’s Phase 4 movies saw diminished box office returns, and Pixar had a notable miss with Lightyear. Peltz and other critics have even questioned Disney’s “creative direction” of late ([8]). The risk is that Disney’s powerhouse studios could lose momentum if they don’t adapt to audience preferences. The company is trying to reinvigorate its slate – e.g. upcoming Avatar sequels, a focus on quality over quantity for Marvel, new Frozen and Toy Story sequels in development – but the creative cycle is hit-driven. Any extended run of content flops (or franchise fatigue among consumers) would hurt Disney’s revenue across film, merchandise, and theme parks. Additionally, evolving consumer habits (e.g. younger audiences on TikTok/YouTube instead of watching Disney Channel or films) pose a long-term challenge to Disney’s content monetization. This risk underscores that innovation in storytelling is required to keep Disney’s brands relevant for new generations.
In summary, Disney faces a confluence of challenges: it must navigate the decline of old businesses while growing new ones, manage a high debt load carefully, execute a turnaround without Iger at the helm in a couple years, and continue delighting customers with content and experiences. Any failure in these areas could derail the bullish thesis. Investors should weigh these risks against the company’s strengths when considering the stock.
Open Questions & Uncertainties
Finally, there are several open questions and wildcards about Disney’s future that merit attention. These are strategic decisions or external factors that could significantly influence Disney’s trajectory (and its stock performance) in the coming years:
– What’s the Plan for TV Networks (ABC/ESPN)? Disney’s traditional TV assets – ABC, the Disney-branded cable channels, and ESPN – are under strategic review. ESPN in particular is pivotal: it’s still profitable, but the cable bundle’s decline means ESPN is preparing to go direct-to-consumer. Bob Iger has hinted at seeking a strategic partner for ESPN, and there have been reports that Disney might sell a stake in ESPN to sports leagues or other investors ([9]). In fact, ESPN has explored the idea of selling equity stakes to major leagues (NFL, NBA, etc.) to help fund its shift to streaming ([9]). Such a move would be unprecedented – potentially securing content access but raising conflicts of interest (leagues owning the broadcaster). Meanwhile, Disney’s ABC network faces an uncertain fate. Rumors of Disney offloading ABC have circulated (though one $20B sale “report” was satire) and at least one Wall Street firm has openly suggested Disney shut down ABC and move its content to streaming ([10]). The rationale: broadcasting has high regulatory costs and secular decline, making resources better spent on digital platforms ([10]) ([10]). Disney has not confirmed any such plan, and it recently denied binding deals to sell ABC. Open question: Will Disney divest or restructure its TV network businesses to focus on streaming, or can it reinvent them for the digital age? The resolution of ESPN’s ownership (whether through a joint venture, partial sale, or kept in-house) and the strategy for ABC/Fox TV networks will significantly impact Disney’s revenue mix and capital needs in the future.
– Can Hulu’s Value Be Unlocked? Disney is in the process of acquiring the remaining 33% stake in Hulu from Comcast, which will give it 100% ownership of Hulu by 2024–2025 ([11]). A third-party valuation recently pegged Hulu’s total value at ~$29 billion, meaning Disney will pay Comcast about ~$9 billion for that final stake ([11]). Once Hulu is fully owned, Disney has decisions to make: how to integrate Hulu with Disney+. Management has indicated an eventual one-app experience, merging Disney+ and Hulu content libraries. This could drive synergies (one tech platform, unified marketing) and help bundle subscriber value, but it’s uncharted territory to blend a family-focused brand (Disney+) with Hulu’s general/general-audience content under one roof. There’s also the question of whether Hulu will expand internationally (currently it’s US-only; Disney+ Star serves as a Hulu-like general content hub abroad). Furthermore, Hulu is a mature service with over 40 million subscribers but also high content costs for its originals and licensed TV shows. Open question: Will Disney be able to grow Hulu’s subscriber base and profit now that it has full control – perhaps by leveraging Hulu content globally – or might Disney even consider spinning off the combined streaming business down the road? Investors will be watching how Disney manages Hulu’s integration and whether cost synergies or pricing power can be realized without alienating subscribers.
– Will Disney Reignite Growth in Disney+ Subscribers? After a meteoric start in 2019–2021, Disney+ subscriber growth has cooled, and in some quarters reversed (largely due to Disney+ Hotstar losses in India after losing cricket rights). Domestically, Disney+ has likely penetrated most households that want it, and the focus has shifted to increasing average revenue per user (ARPU) via price hikes and upselling the bundled plans (Disney+ with Hulu and ESPN+). The concern is that price increases (Disney+ recently raised monthly rates and plans an ad-supported tier) could cause churn if not met with strong content offerings. Disney is banking on tentpole originals (Star Wars series, Marvel series, etc.) and exclusive films to keep the service sticky. However, competition from Netflix, Amazon, and Max means content differentiation is key. Open questions: What is the saturation point for Disney+ in key markets, and can Disney meaningfully grow subs in emerging markets to make up for slower US/Europe growth? Also, how will the economics of streaming evolve – will Disney+ eventually bundle with Hulu/ESPN+ as a single offering, and can it reach the profitability of Netflix? The answers will determine if DTC truly becomes the cash cow to replace the declining cable business.
– How Will the Next CEO Steer the Ship? As mentioned, Disney will have a new CEO by 2026. Bob Iger’s successor will inherit a very different Disney than in years past – one heavily into streaming, possibly without some legacy assets, and with a need for digital-native leadership. The identity and vision of the next CEO is an open question. Will Disney promote an internal candidate (several division heads like Dana Walden (TV content), Josh D’Amaro (Parks), or Kevin Mayer’s return have been speculated), or recruit an external leader with tech/media expertise? And what strategic shifts might occur under new leadership? For instance, could a new CEO consider bold moves like mergers (there’s perennial chatter about Apple or another giant potentially eyeing Disney, though nothing concrete) or spinning off divisions? The new CEO might also revisit cost structures or content strategies. Given Disney’s cultural legacy, any change at the top is significant. Open question: Can Disney seamlessly transition to new leadership that keeps the company’s creative engine running while accelerating its transformation? Investors will seek clarity on succession and the strategic direction in the post-Iger era.
– Macro Wildcards: Broader external factors remain uncertainties for Disney. Will economic conditions cooperate? Disney’s businesses (theme parks, movie box office, consumer products) are sensitive to consumer spending and sentiment. A strong economy boosts travel to Disney resorts and movie ticket sales; a recession would do the opposite. Likewise, geopolitical events (e.g. international travel restrictions, currency fluctuations impacting tourism, etc.) can impact Disney. The ongoing recovery of international tourism (especially from Asia to Disney’s U.S. parks) is something to watch – it has upside potential if travel normalizes further. Conversely, another shock (like a pandemic resurgence or global conflict) would be a negative. Another wildcard: technological disruption – e.g. the rise of AI in content creation or new forms of entertainment (VR/AR experiences, TikTok-style short video dominance) – could alter the competitive landscape in ways difficult to predict. Disney is experimenting with technologies (for instance, using AI for personalization in ESPN’s upcoming app ([12])), but it must keep up with how new tech might change media consumption.
In sum, while Disney is a storied company with a strong portfolio of assets, many questions remain open regarding how it will adapt and evolve. Bernstein’s bullish stance assumes that Disney will successfully navigate these uncertainties – by restructuring where needed, leveraging its IP effectively, and capitalizing on growth opportunities in streaming and parks. Investors will be watching upcoming quarters closely for evidence that Disney is answering these open questions in a shareholder-friendly way. The path Disney chooses for ESPN/ABC, the integration of Hulu, the stewardship of the next CEO, and the company’s creative output will collectively shape whether Disney truly “earns its magic” for investors in the years ahead.
Conclusion: Despite the mixed recent earnings and formidable challenges discussed, Disney’s iconic brand and asset mix position it for a potential turnaround. Bernstein’s Outperform rating reflects confidence that the company’s long-term fundamentals – strong cash flows, unique content franchises, and improving earnings trajectory – will win out. If Disney can execute on cost cuts, reignite its creative pipeline, and smoothly transition to new leadership, the current stock price could undervalue its future earnings power. However, the execution risks are significant. Going forward, clear signals of progress (or lack thereof) on the open questions above will likely determine whether Disney’s stock finally delights investors or leaves them wishing upon a star.
Sources: Disney Investor Relations (SEC filings, press releases), Bernstein research via InsiderMonkey and Investing.com, and news reports (Reuters, Axios, Euronews) for recent developments and context. All factual information and data points have been sourced and cited inline. ([1]) ([3]) ([5]) ([5]) ([5]) ([6]) ([8]) ([7]) ([9]) ([10]) ([11]) ([5])
Sources
- https://insidermonkey.com/blog/bernstein-affirms-outperform-on-walt-disney-dis-despite-mixed-earnings-1652360/
- https://euronews.com/business/2023/12/01/disneys-dividend-is-back-after-a-three-year-suspension
- https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/the-walt-disney-company-declares-cash-dividend-of-0-30-per-share/
- https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/the-walt-disney-company-declares-cash-dividend-of-1-00-per-share/
- https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1744489/000174448923000216/dis-20230930.htm
- https://za.investing.com/news/analyst-ratings/bernstein-maintains-disney-stock-outperform-with-120-target-93CH-3700201
- https://reuters.com/business/media-telecom/disney-names-james-gorman-new-chairman-announce-next-ceo-early-2026-2024-10-21/
- https://reuters.com/business/media-telecom/disney-poised-claim-victory-bitter-peltz-board-fight-2024-04-03/
- https://axios.com/2024/01/21/espn-disney-strategic-partner-nfl-nba-mlb
- https://reuters.com/business/disney-should-shut-down-abc-transfer-content-streaming-brokerage-says-2025-09-23/
- https://axios.com/2025/06/09/disney-hulu-comcast
- https://reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/disney-sees-ai-helping-personalize-new-espn-app-2024-08-28/
For informational purposes only; not investment advice.
